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His or Her Divorce? The Gendered 
Nature of Divorce and its 
Determinants
Matthijs Kalmijn and Anne-Rigt Poortman
Contrary to previous studies treating divorce as a couple’s decision, we make a distinction 
between ‘his’, ‘her’, and ‘their’ divorce by using information about who initiated divorce. 
Using competing risk analysis, we re-examine four well-known determinants of divorce: (i) 
the wife’s employment, (ii) the financial situation of the household, (iii) the presence of 
children, and (iv) the quality of the match. Because existing arguments on the underlying 
mechanisms focus on the relative costs and benefits of a divorce for the wife, the husband 
and/or the couple, this approach offers new insights into the validity of competing theo-
ries. Our results confirm some theoretical interpretations, but they refute others. Further-
more, our findings shed light on the gendered nature of divorce. We not only find that 
women more often take the initiative to divorce, we also find that many social and eco-
nomic determinants have stronger effects on ‘her’ divorce than on ‘his’ divorce. The one 
exception is children, which seem to affect men’s decision to (not) divorce more strongly 
than women’s decision.
Introduction
Most empirical analyses of the determinants of divorce
treat divorce as an event. Authors typically employ
event-history models in which the dependent variable is
the conditional odds of experiencing a divorce in a given
year rather than not experiencing a divorce (Waite and
Lillard, 1991; Hoem, 1997; Ono, 1998; Berrington and
Diamond, 1999; Brines and Joyner, 1999; South, 2001;
Poortman and Kalmijn, 2002; Wagner and Weiss, 2003).
The regression coefficients in these models show how
much the divorce risk is reduced or increased by changes
in the independent variable. Although this is a standard
method of analysing why people divorce, it tells us little
about how the decision to divorce was made. In this
study, we take a different approach of identifying the
determinants of divorce by focusing on the question of
whether the husband, the wife, or both spouses were the
initiator of the divorce. We employ event-history mod-
els in which information on the decision process is
incorporated. More specifically, our dependent variable
is not simply the conditional odds of experiencing a
divorce (instead of not experiencing a divorce), but
rather the conditional odds of experiencing a certain
type of divorce: a divorce initiated by the husband, a
divorce initiated by the wife, or a divorce initiated by
husband and wife together.
There are two reasons why this approach can contrib-
ute to our understanding of divorce. Differences between
men and women in the degree to which they initiate a
divorce tell us something about gender differences in
marriage. Several decades ago, when divorce rates were
beginning to increase, sociologists argued that a mar-
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and ‘her’ marriage (Bernard, 1976). It was believed that
men and women not only had different perceptions of
the way their marriage was organized, they would also
gain different benefits from marriage, with the husband
benefiting and the wife benefiting less or even being
harmed by marriage. Many sophisticated studies have
been done since then on the positive and negative effects
of marriage on outcomes ranging from happiness and
loneliness to health and suicide (Waite, 1995; Joung,
1996; Peters and Liefbroer, 1997; England, 2000; Simon,
2002; Williams and Umberson, 2004). Most studies find
positive effects of marriage, but debate remains about
whether men and women benefit equally (England,
2000; Waite and Gallagher, 2000).
Gender differences in the benefits of marriage also play
a role in the debate about the rise in divorce. Several
authors have argued that the rise in divorce is in part due
to the growing autonomy of women in society, which gave
them more room to respond to the presumably meagre
benefits they were getting out of marriage (e.g. Ruggles,
1997). Parallel to the distinction between ‘his’ and ‘her’
marriage, we can therefore make a distinction between
‘his’ and ‘her’ divorce. Such a distinction, we believe, pro-
vides alternative evidence on the degree to which there are
differences in the benefits that men and women gain from
marriage. Moreover, exploring the determinants of ‘his’
and ‘her’ divorce separately can provide further insight
into the causes of such gender differences.
A second reason why it is important to incorporate
information about the decision process is more theoreti-
cal. The literature in past decades has focused on the
social and economic determinants of divorce risks, in
part because such variables play a potentially important
role in explaining the trend in divorce. Examples of such
variables are whether the couple has children, the age at
marriage, and the employment of the wife. A problem
with such analyses is that there are often multiple and
typically competing theoretical mechanisms involved.
For example, the employment of the wife has a positive
effect on divorce, but this may be due to considerations
of specialization, to the wife’s economic independence,
or to the husband’s disapproval of a working wife (e.g.
South, 2001). While it is important to document the
employment effect, the effect itself tells us little about
which theory is most likely to be true. Because these dif-
ferent interpretations are directed specifically to the
marital costs and benefits for wives, husbands, and cou-
ples, we gain additional insight into the underlying theo-
retical mechanisms if we analyse the effects of standard
determinants not simply on the risk of divorce, but on
the type of divorce as well.
The data we analyse come from a retrospective life-
course survey of men and women in the Netherlands.
The data include detailed and dynamic information
about important social and economic characteristics of
respondents and their (former) partner. In addition,
several questions were asked about the divorce process,
including questions about who took the first step in the
process. Note that this question is more informative
than the more frequently asked question about who files
for divorce first (Goode, 1993). Our measure relates to a
point earlier in the divorce process and is therefore more
closely related to the causes of divorce. During later
stages of the divorce process spouses may negotiate and
make arrangements about how to officially settle the
divorce, thereby blurring spouses’ initial interests in the
divorce.
Theoretical Background
Following common theoretical work on divorce, we
argue that the risk of divorce depends on the perceived
benefits of remaining married vis-à-vis the perceived
benefits of being outside the marriage, which is either
being unmarried or being married to someone else.
When we speak of benefits, we refer to net benefits, that
is, benefits minus costs. If the difference between the net
benefits of marriage and the net benefits of being outside
of marriage – what we call the perceived relative benefits
of marriage – is negative, a divorce may occur. Important
to emphasize is that people can have different percep-
tions of similar benefits.
When the perceived relative benefits of the two
spouses are cross-classified, several combinations are
possible, and for the sake of simplicity, we categorize
these into four groups: (i) both spouses have negative
perceived relative benefits, (ii) the husband has negative
benefits, the wife positive benefits, (iii) the husband has
positive benefits, the wife negative benefits, and (iv)
both have positive benefits. Our general assumption is
that the person who has negative perceived relative ben-
efits is more likely to take part in the initiative to
divorce. Hence, we expect a higher chance of ‘his’
divorce in case (ii), a higher chance of ‘her’ divorce in case
(iii), and a higher chance of a ‘joint’ divorce in case (i).
The reasoning above assumes that there is a simple
relation between having an interest in the divorce on the
one hand, and taking initiative to do so on the other
hand. Although older small-scale studies suggest that
this relationship is quite substantial (Pettit and Bloom,
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complicated. We do not examine these reasons empiri-
cally but we do review the most important theoretical
arguments.
The relationship is complicated in two ways: People
may not take the initiative even if their interests tell
them to do so and people may not tell the researcher
honestly about who took the initiative. The direction of
bias is not directly clear. First, people have a tendency to
protect their self-esteem. If the spouse has an interest in
the divorce, a person may decide to take (part in) the
initiative because a unilateral divorce decision by the
spouse threatens one’s self-esteem. For similar reasons,
persons may overstate their role in the initiative to the
researcher. It has been suggested that overstatements of
own initiative are a form of taking control over the situ-
ation retroactively and that such behaviour facilitates
coping with the divorce (Gray and Silver, 1990). Second,
there is the self-serving bias (Campbell et al., 2000). Peo-
ple often avoid being blamed for the divorce decision
because a divorce is generally considered a failure. This
may lead to a tendency to let the spouse do the breaking
up when there are in fact joint interests in the divorce.
More importantly, it may motivate a person to blame
the spouse even if he or she took (part in) the initiative.
The direction of the self-esteem bias is toward ego,
whereas the direction of the self-serving bias is away
from ego. It is difficult to say what this implies for the
frequency distribution of answers.
On the basis of prevailing theories on divorce we
develop predictions about how effects of four well-
known determinants of divorce may differ between ‘his’,
‘her’, and ‘their’ divorce. The factors we consider are: (i)
the employment of the wife, (ii) the financial situation of
the household, (iii) the presence of children, and (iv) the
quality of the match. In the theoretical discussion below,
we use the following short-hand notation for the three
types of effects: (J) effect on a ‘joint’ divorce versus no
divorce, (M) effect on a ‘male’ divorce versus no divorce,
(F) effect on a ‘female’ divorce versus no divorce.
Employment of the Wife
One of the most frequently discussed hypotheses con-
cerns the employment of the wife. Wife’s employment is
generally found to increase the chances to divorce
(South, 2001; Blossfeld and Muller, 2002; Poortman and
Kalmijn, 2002; Wagner and Weiss, 2003; Rogers, 2004).
There are many reasons why this is so, but economic and
cultural arguments have been dominant. The most
influential economic argument comes from microeco-
nomics and argues that the benefits of marriage largely
derive from task specialization (Becker, 1981). When
married women begin participating in the labour mar-
ket, the benefits of specialization in marriage decline.
Because specialization gains accrue to both spouses
(Becker, 1981), it implies that women’s employment
should primarily affect the odds of a joint divorce.
Another economic hypothesis focuses on the eco-
nomic independence that is obtained from outside
employment. Women with a strong labour market posi-
tion have relatively small financial exit costs, which
makes it easier to dissolve an unsatisfactory marriage
(Cherlin, 1979; Oppenheimer, 1994). Because the eco-
nomic independence argument applies primarily to the
wife, we expect that a strong labour market position of
the wife increases the odds of a female divorce, while it
does not increase the odds of a male divorce or a joint
divorce (for a similar argument, see Rogers, 2004).
Outside employment might not only lead to lower fin-
ancial costs of a divorce, it may also change the percep-
tions of those costs. For example, employment could
strengthen women in their belief that they are compe-
tent and capable of establishing an independent house-
hold (e.g. Kessler and McRae, 1982) and this may lower
the threshold to divorce. In a sense, employment not
only increases women’s economic independence, it also
increases their psychological independence, and this
increases the chances of ‘her’ divorce by decreasing the
perceived costs of divorce.
The dominant cultural argument about wife’s
employment is derived from older sociological studies
about gender roles. Given that couples adhere to a tradi-
tional gender role ideology, husbands will have difficulty
accepting the wife’s employment, particularly when this
employment cannot be perceived as temporary or sec-
ondary to the household income (for a classic statement,
see Komarovsky, 1962). Husbands may perceive their
wife’s career as competing with their own occupational
position. In addition, their identity, which is often
strongly tied to their breadwinner role, may be threat-
ened (Parsons, 1949). Because this argument applies pri-
marily to the husband, it implies that a wife’s strong
labour market position increases the odds of a male
divorce, while it does not increase the female or joint
divorce odds.
The reasoning above leads to conflicting predictions.
If the specialization mechanism is more important than
the independence and cultural mechanisms, the joint
divorce odds should be more strongly affected than the
male or female divorce odds (J>M and J>F). If the inde-
pendence mechanism is more important, the female
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male and joint divorce odds (F>M and F>J). If the cul-
tural mechanism is more important, the male divorce
odds should be more strongly affected (M>F and M>J).
Financial Situation of the Household
Several authors have suggested a negative income effect
on divorce. Evidence for this hypothesis has been
obtained by examining effects of variables such as
household income, husband’s unemployment, and dir-
ect measures of financial problems. This hypothesis
argues that couples in a poor financial position are more
likely to divorce than couples in a better financial posi-
tion. The evidence has been moderately supportive of
this hypothesis (Broman et al., 1990; Hoffman and
Duncan, 1995; Ono, 1998). The income effect can be
accounted for by two mechanisms. The first has to do
with cultural arguments about gender roles. A poor fin-
ancial position can often be attributed to the husband
being unable to provide for his family. Financial prob-
lems are a potential threat to the husband’s role as
breadwinner. And just as wife’s employment may be dis-
approved of by the husband, the husband’s inability to
provide for his family may be disapproved of by the wife.
A different line of reasoning focuses on couple consid-
erations. When the financial means in the household are
limited, there are more financial worries and couples
will have a difficult time making ends meet. It is gener-
ally expected that financial difficulties lead to economic
strain, which in turn has negative consequences for the
degree of harmony in marriage (Conger et al., 1990;
Voydanoff, 1990). This leads to more marital conflict,
lower marital satisfaction and a corresponding increase
in the chance of divorce.
These arguments lead to different predictions. If the
cultural mechanism is true – the wife disapproves of the
husband not fulfilling his breadwinner role – we would
expect to find stronger effects of the couple’s financial
position on the odds of a female divorce than on the
odds of a male or a joint divorce (F>M and F>J). If the
economic strain mechanism is true, effects of the finan-
cial position should be stronger on the odds of a joint
divorce than on the odds of a male or female divorce
(J>M and J>F). A further specification of the economic
strains argument could be made on the basis of a gender
difference in the perception of these strains. Particularly,
it has been argued that women are more sensitive than
men to internal problems within marriage (Amato and
Rogers, 1997). If this is true, we might also suspect that
the female odds are more strongly affected than the male
odds (J>F>M). This is a special case of J>M and J>F.
Presence of Children
A third, often-studied, hypothesis concerns the bonding
effect of children. Numerous studies have shown that
couples with children are less likely to divorce than
childless couples, in particular when these children are
still young (Heaton, 1990; Remez, 1990; Waite and
Lillard, 1991; Kalmijn, 1999). Children are generally
believed to function as a form of marital capital that ties
spouses together. Dependencies are different for men
and women, however. One mechanism is economic and
is based on the fact that the financial costs of divorce are
higher for women who have children. Divorced women
with children living at home are less likely to be employed
and will therefore be in a poorer financial position
(Holden and Smock, 1991; Smock, 1994; Poortman,
2000). Another mechanism is social and argues that the
social costs of divorce are higher for men who have chil-
dren. Fathers rarely have custody and do not see their
children often after divorce. The losses after a divorce
are therefore higher for fathers than for men who do not
yet have children (Seltzer, 1991; Lye, 1996; Kalmijn,
1999).
The implications of these arguments are different
depending on whose benefits and costs we focus on. If
the economic mechanism is more important than the
social argument, the female odds should be affected
more strongly by children than the male or joint odds
(F>M and F>J). If the social mechanism is more import-
ant than the economic argument, the male odds should
be affected more strongly (M>F and M>J).
The Quality of the Match
A fourth influential hypothesis addresses the quality of
the match. The argument here is that the better a person
has searched on the marriage market, the better the
quality of the match, and the lower the chance of divorce
(Becker, 1981). Important indicators for match quality
are the age at which spouses married, the time it took
them to get to know each other, and the degree of
homogamy. Studies have shown that people who marry
young or after a short acquaintance period are more
likely to divorce (Brüderl et al., 1997).
The implication of this argument is that a poorer
quality of the match will lower the relative benefits of
marriage for both spouses. Hence, we would expect to
find stronger effects of match quality variables, like age
at marriage and acquaintance period, on the odds of a
joint divorce than on the odds of a unilateral divorce.
Although a poor match quality results in lower relative
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true that husband and wife will perceive their relation-
ship in a similar way. Because women might be more
sensitive toward marital problems than men (Amato
and Rogers, 1997), we expect that poor match quality
will affect the odds of a female divorce more than it
affect the odds of a male divorce. We thus expect that
match quality variables increase the odds of a joint
divorce more than the odds of a unilateral divorce, but
that a female divorce is more affected than a male
divorce (J>F>M).
We also look at age differences between spouses. In
past research, age differences have been found to
increase the chance to divorce (Janssen et al., 1999).
Couples with large age differences are more unstable,
and this effect is stronger for couples in which women
are much older than for couples in which men are much
older. Because age differences affect the quality of the
relationship, we believe that age differences will increase
the chance of a joint divorce. Whether the male or
female risks are affected more is not clear beforehand.
On the one hand, one could argue that women are more
sensitive to marital problems, implying that the effect of
age differences is greater on the odds of a female divorce
than on the odds of a male divorce (J>F>M). On the
other hand, men tend to report somewhat stronger pref-
erences regarding the partner’s age than women. In
other words, men and women might have different per-
ceptions of the costs and benefits associated with age dif-
ferences. Although both men and women prefer the case
where the husband is older to the case where the hus-
band is younger, these preferences are stronger for men
(South, 1991; Vossen, 1999). This suggests that the
effects may be stronger for a male than for a female
divorce (J>M>F).
Data
We analyse a retrospective life-history survey from the
Netherlands (Kalmijn et al., 2000). The sample was
based on a selection of 19 municipalities, which were
representative of the Dutch population with respect to
region and urbanization. From the population registers
of these municipalities, three random samples were
drawn: (i) a sample of first married persons, (ii) a sam-
ple of divorced persons who were not remarried, and
(iii) a sample of remarried persons. Because divorced
persons could be over sampled beforehand, the sample
size of the survey was smaller than what it would have
been in a normal random sample. The oversample obvi-
ously increases the proportion of divorced persons in the
sample, but it should not affect differences in divorce
probabilities across subgroups. As a result, tests of
hypotheses will not be affected.
We limited the analysis to first marriages (i.e. persons
either in a first marriage or separated from a first mar-
riage). After excluding cases with missing data on central
characteristics (i.e. type of divorce and work history),
the sample consists of 942 male respondents and 1293
female respondents. As is often the case, data on former
spouses were obtained from respondents’ reports. This
reduces the amount of information we were able to
obtain on the spouse. Our data on the life histories of
respondents are therefore more detailed than our data
on the life histories of the (former) spouses.
Measures of His, Her, and Their divorce
Earlier qualitative research suggests that people generally
have little difficulty in identifying who took the initiative
in the divorce process (Hopper, 1993). To measure this
in our structured survey interviews, we asked the follow-
ing question, which refers to the early stages of the
divorce process: ‘In the divorce process, it sometimes
occurs that one of the two spouses takes the first step. In
your case, who first made the decision to separate? Was
that you, your partner, or you and your partner more or
less simultaneously?’
Results presented in Table 1 show that women more
often take the initiative than men (61 per cent versus
29 per cent). Joint divorces are relatively rare (10 per cent).
When we compare men and women, we see that women
more often report own-initiative than partner-initiative,
while men report own-initiative almost as often as partner-
initiative. Men also report more joint initiative than
women do. Because the male and female data are both
based on random samples of the ever-divorced popula-
tion in the 19 municipalities, the differences we find are
probably related to measurement error. On the one
hand, women may have had a tendency to protect their
self-esteem by claiming initiative that they in fact did not
have. On the other hand, men may attribute the initia-
tive to their wife even if they themselves took the first
step. It is most likely that a combination of the two
biases occurs. If the truth lies in the middle, we can con-
clude that women are about twice as likely to take the
initiative to divorce as men, a substantial difference.
To what extent is there a correspondence between ini-
tiative and the perceived net benefits of divorce? In the
interview, we asked respondents to assess what their
attitude was at the time of the divorce: Were they in
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were they somewhere in between these extremes? A
similar question was used to assess what the respond-
ent thinks the spouse thought of the divorce. We com-
bined the two attitude items into one variable with the
following categories: (1) respondent more positive
about the divorce than the spouse, (2) both more or
less positive about the divorce, and (3) the spouse more
positive about the divorce than the respondent. There
are also a few cases where both spouses were negative
about the divorce, and these are included in category 2.
To assess the association, we code the initiative variable
from 1 (own initiative) to 3 (partner initiative). The
cross-tabulation between the two measures is pre-
sented in Table 2.
Table 2 confirms that when ego is more positive, it
was virtually always ego who took the initiative. When
the spouse was more positive, it was mostly the spouse
who took the initiative, although to a lesser extent. The
lowest degree of consistency is found for cases where
both spouses were positive about the divorce decision.
Here too, we see a tendency toward ego-initiative, but
what is more important is that we underestimate joint
initiative. However this may be, we note that the corre-
lation between the two measures is 0.72, which is high.
Although there may be some tendency toward retro-
spective alignment of answers on such questions, the
correlation points to a substantial degree of overlap
between the degree of initiative and the attitudes
people have toward their divorce. This gives us confid-
ence in the applicability of our theoretical approach.
The only caveat we should make is that joint interests
will sometimes be included in the category of unilateral
initiative.
Additional analyses using information about who
filed for divorce, which refers to later stages of the
divorce process, further substantiates our confidence in
measuring initiative early in the divorce process. The
question about who filed for divorce may capture bene-
fits of the legal divorce settlement rather than initial
marital benefits, and is only moderately correlated with
our measure for divorce initiative (r = 0.63). Further-
more, the correlation between filing for divorce and
spouses’ attitudes towards divorce is lower (r = 0.48)
than the correlation between our measure of taking ini-
tiative and spouses’ attitudes toward divorce found in
Table 2 (r = 0.72). Hence, initiative early in the divorce
process is more closely related to the theoretical notion
of marital benefits.
Table 1 Frequency distribution of who takes the initiative for the divorce by gender
Note: The combined percentage is the average of the male and female percentages.





Wife took initiative 60.8 75.5 46.0
Husband took initiative 28.8 17.3 40.3
Both took initiative 10.5 7.2 13.7
Total 100 100 100
n 1700 1015 685
Table 2 Association between taking initiative and spouses’ evaluation of the divorce decision at the time of divorce
Notes: The correlation is r = 0.72. Number of divorces does not equal 1700 due to 12 respondents who have missing data on the evaluation variable.







Ego took initiative 94.0 54.0 15.0
Both took initiative 3.0 23.0 6.0
Spouse took initiative 2.0 23.0 79.0
Total 100 100 100
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Models and Measures of the Independent 
Variables
We use competing risk analyses to test our hypotheses.
To this aim, we constructed a person-period file, with
years as the unit, starting with the year of marriage and
ending with the survey year (if still married) or the sepa-
ration year (if divorced) and applied multinomial logis-
tic regression analysis. Note that divorce refers to the
moment when the couple stopped living together. Three
types of divorce are distinguished in the analyses: her
divorce (initiated by the wife), his divorce (initiated by
the husband) and joint divorce (initiated by both
spouses). These three types of divorces are treated in the
analyses as separate categories of the dependent variable
and a distinction can be made between: (1) the condi-
tional probability of her divorce versus staying married,
(2) the conditional probability of his divorce versus stay-
ing married, and (3) the conditional probability of a joint
divorce versus staying married. The multinomial logistic
regression model for the person-period data approxi-
mates a continuous-time competing risk model
(Yamaguchi, 1991). We present coefficients for each of
the three equations as well as Wald tests indicating
whether the coefficients differ between pairs of equations.
The models include the following measures for the
theoretically considered variables.
Employment of the wife. Wife’s working hours – a time-
varying variable indicating how many hours per week the
wife works for pay during marriage, ranging from 0 to 40.
This variable has been constructed on the basis of the
respondent’s complete work history. Because we lack data
on the complete work history of the spouse, this variable
only refers to female respondents and is only included in
the analyses of a sub-sample of female respondents.
Financial situation of the household. Financial difficulties –
whether the respondent experienced the following financial
problems during the first years of marriage: (i) difficulty
in making ends meet, (ii) not being able to quickly replace
broken items, (iii) whether they had to borrow money for
necessary expenditures, (iv) whether they were behind
with payments for rent/mortgage or gas/water/electricity,
(v) whether they had visits from creditors, and (vi)
whether they had received financial support from friends
or family. On the basis of these six items, we constructed a
scale counting the number of financial problems, ranging
from 0 to 6 (Cronbach’s α = 0.75).
Presence of children. Presence and age of children – a time-
varying set of mutually exclusive variables using informa-
tion about whether there are children living at home and
the age of the youngest child. Five groups are distinguished:
(i) no children (reference group), (ii) children living at
home and youngest child 0–6 years old, (iii) children living
at home and youngest child 7–12 years old, (iv) children
living at home and youngest child 13 years or older, and (v)
all children left the parental home (i.e. empty nest).
Married young. Whether the average age at marriage of
husband and wife was 20 years or younger.
Duration of acquaintance. The number of years the cou-
ple was dating before they got married in case couples
did not cohabit before marriage. In case of premarital
cohabitation, the cohabitation period (also measured in
years) is added to the dating period.
Age differences between spouses. Measured by distin-
guishing three groups: (i) husband more than five years
older than the wife, (ii) wife more than one year older
than the husband, and (iii) other combinations (the ref-
erence group). Because there are relatively few couples
in which the husband is younger than the wife, the cut-
off point is set to an age difference of only one year
rather than five years.
All models control for: marital duration and duration
squared (measured in years; a quadratic parameteriza-
tion fits the data best), calendar year (measured in
years), whether the couple cohabitated prior to mar-
riage, whether both spouses were church members at the
time of marriage, whether the couple lived in a city in
the beginning of marriage, a premarital pregnancy, and
the educational level of husband and wife (measured in
years). Means and standard deviations of all independ-
ent variables are presented in Table 3.
Results
Two models are estimated: a model for men and women
combined, which does not include the variable working
hours (Table 4), and a model for women only, which
includes the variable working hours (Table 5). Other-
wise, the models are similar. The last model is added
because we only have dynamic work data for women in
case of female respondents.
Important to note is that the significance of the effects
in Tables 4 and 5 depends upon the number of events.
The effects on a female divorce are therefore more likely
to be significant than the effects on a male divorce. The
effects on a joint divorce are least likely to be significant
(about 10 per cent of the events). Hence, the magnitude
of the effects and the tests for differences in the effects
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First, we observe that there is a significant positive
effect of the wife’s working hours on the odds of a female
divorce (Table 5). In other words, the more hours the
wife works, the more likely it is that she will end the
marriage. The male odds to divorce are not affected and
the difference between the two coefficients (the effect on
a female divorce minus the effect on a male divorce) is
significant. We also observe that the joint odds to
divorce are affected in a positive fashion, but the
number of cases is too small to make this effect or differ-
ences with the other effects significant. These results
suggest that an interpretation of the employment effect
in terms of women’s economic or psychological inde-
pendence is more plausible than an interpretation in
terms of normative disapproval by the husband.
Our second hypothesis addresses the role of financial
difficulties for marital stability. Tables 4 and 5 show that
couples with financial difficulties are more likely to
divorce than other couples. This effect is strongest for
the odds of a female divorce. Note, however, that the dif-
ferences between the coefficients are not large enough to
be significant. Given the large differences in the magni-
tude of the effects, we are tempted to conclude that these
results are in line with the notion that wives disapprove
of a husband who fails to provide for his family. The
results are less consistent with an interpretation in terms
of economic strain, which should affect both partners
and, hence, implies the strongest effect on the odds of a
joint divorce. Because an auxiliary hypothesis was that
women are more sensitive to economic strains, the
stronger effects on a female divorce could also be inter-
preted as support for the idea that women are more sen-
sitive to marital problems.
Third, we examine the influence of children on
divorce. Table 4 shows that couples with children, and
especially young children, are less likely to divorce than
other couples. All three types of divorce are affected, but
the odds of a male divorce are affected more strongly
than the odds of a female divorce. For young children,
the difference between the male and female coefficients
is marginally significant. We argued that children
increase the economic exit costs for women and the
social exit costs for men. Although both notions are
valid given the strong effects on all types of divorce, the
differences we observe are more supportive of the social
mechanism than they are supportive of the economic
mechanism.
We argued that aspects of the quality of the match
should primarily affect the odds of a joint divorce. The
results in Table 4 are generally not in line with this
expectation. A young age at marriage has a positive
effect on divorce, as expected, but the effect is more or
Table 3 Means and standard deviations of the independent variables: combined sample
aBased on female sample (n = 1290 in first year of marriage).
Notes: For time-varying variables means apply to the first year of marriage (n = 2229). Standard deviations not reported for dichotomous variables.




Duration marriage 0.00 0.00 Yes
Period 30.37 11.02 Yes
Premarital cohabitation 0.35 No
Church membership 0.44 No
Urbanized residence 0.69 No
Premarital pregnancy 0.09 No
Wife’s education 10.80 2.76 No
Husband’s education 11.45 3.03 No
Wife’s working hoursa 30.32 15.89 Yes
Financial problems 1.05 1.47 No
Children 0–6 0.13 Yes
Children 6–12 0.00 Yes
Children 12–18 0.00 Yes
Empty nest 0.00 Yes
Married young 0.09 No
Duration of acquaintance 3.40 2.63 No
Wife younger 0.18 No
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less the same for each of the three odds. The Wald tests
in Tables 4 and 5 confirm that the effect on a joint
divorce is not stronger than the effects on a unilateral
divorce.
Another important indicator of match quality is the
length of time the couple knew each other before they
began to live together. This variable has the expected
negative effect in Table 4: the longer the couple was
acquainted, the less likely a divorce will be. This effect is
not stronger for the joint odds, which refutes our
hypothesis. More importantly, the effect is stronger on
the female odds than on the male odds. This is margin-
ally significant for the full sample and significant for the
female sample. In other words, a short search period pri-
marily increases women’s odds of leaving the marriage,
not men’s. This supports our auxiliary hypothesis stat-
ing that women are more sensitive to marital problems
than men.
Age differences between spouses are also significantly
related to marital stability. We first expected that age dif-
ferences would be associated with a greater likelihood of
a joint divorce. In both Tables 4 and 5, we see partial
evidence for this. When the husband is younger than the
wife, the couple is more likely to divorce than when they
are of more or less the same age. This effect is strongest
for the odds of a joint divorce. Differences between the
effect on a joint divorce and the effect on a female
divorce are significant in both Tables 4 and 5. The con-
trast between the effects on a male and a female divorce
suggest that men indeed are more sensitive to age differ-
ences (Table 5).
When we consider the other type of age heterogamy
(i.e. an older husband with a younger wife) we do not
generally find the often-documented disruptive effect.
Our results show that when the husband is much older,
the couple is more rather than less stable than age-
homogenous couples. While our theoretical starting
point differs from what we observe in the tables, the dif-
ferences across equations can still be informative. We
expected that the husband would be more sensitive
toward age differences than the wife, and this is clearly
supported. The male odds of divorce are more strongly
affected than the female odds when the wife is much
younger. These differences are (marginally) significant
in both tables and support our auxiliary hypothesis.
Finally, we discuss the effects of our control variables.
We first see that there is an effect of sex. This effect
essentially replicates the results presented in Table 1.
Women more often report own initiative than men. In
addition, we see expected effects of marriage duration,
period, premarital cohabitation, parental church visits,
and urbanized residence. Since the effects are in line
with earlier studies, we will not discuss them at length.
Important to note are cases where effects are different
for the three types of risk. In Table 4 we see that church
membership has stronger effects on the joint odds of
divorce than on the unilateral odds. In addition, we see
that in Table 5 the effect of urbanized residence is signif-
icantly stronger for a joint divorce than for unilateral
divorces. The interpretation of the effects of these varia-
bles has often been in cultural terms. Persons who are
not religious and who live in urbanized areas have more
lenient norms against divorce than others. That the
effects are stronger on the joint odds is consistent with
this interpretation. When a marriage is in trouble, cou-
ples with more permissive social norms about divorce
probably mutually agree on the decision to divorce.
Education is another important control variable to dis-
cuss. The wife’s education has a positive effect on divorce
but this is only true when a female divorce is considered.
We also find that the husband’s education has a negative
effect on her divorce initiative. When we look at the odds
of a male divorce, the results are exactly the opposite. The
higher the education of the husband, the more likely it is
that he will take the initiative to divorce. In addition,
women’s education has a negative effect on his divorce
initiative. These results suggest that a higher education
leads to more own initiative. Highly educated persons
may be more likely to believe that they can establish an
independent household after divorce and they may also
have fewer moral objections to divorce.
Conclusions
This study has provided new evidence on the determi-
nants of divorce by incorporating information on who
initiated the divorce in the standard event-history
approach. We applied this new way of modelling the
divorce process to four important and well-documented
divorce determinants: the wife’s employment, the finan-
cial situation of the household, the presence of children,
and the quality of the match. The analyses yield several
interesting conclusions.
First, we find that the effect of the wife’s employment
is stronger on women’s initiative than on men’s initia-
tive to divorce. Theoretically, we argued that there are
three interpretations of the effect of the wife’s employ-
ment. Female employment can make women more inde-
pendent, which reduces her gains to marriage. At the
same time, the wife’s employment can be normatively
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from a traditional division of labour. Finally, the wife’s
employment can reduce the gains to specialization, and
such gains are lost for both spouses. All three arguments
have been made in the literature, but few studies have
been able to separate the three interpretations. Our work
presents new evidence on this issue and suggests that the
independence argument is most plausible. Effects of the
wife’s working hours are significant for her divorce but
they are insignificant for his divorce and insignificant for
a joint divorce. Hence, arguments about specialization
and about normative disapproval of working wives
receive little support. This conclusion is somewhat in
contrast to earlier work on divorce in the Netherlands,
which showed that wife’s labour market experience and
occupational status, both indicators of economic inde-
pendence, had no clear effects on the risk of divorce
(Poortman and Kalmijn, 2002). Perhaps the earlier-
noted psychological dimension of independence is relev-
ant here as well. Employment gives women a feeling of
self-esteem, which increases the perceived ability to
establish a life on one’s own. In a sense, employment
may not change the actual costs of divorce but it may
change the perceived costs of divorce quite substantially.
We also examined the often-documented destabiliz-
ing effect of financial problems in marriage. Financial
problems were found to have a stronger effect on a
female divorce than on a male or a joint divorce. Classic
arguments about financial problems point in two direc-
tions: social norms about the male breadwinner role and
financial strains in marriage. Because we find no effects
on a joint divorce, we conclude that the argument about
financial strains is less plausible. After all, both spouses
should be affected by financial strains, and a joint
divorce should be more likely. Since the effects are
strong on a female divorce, the argument about social
norms seems more plausible. Because husbands are gen-
erally the main providers in marriage, the wife may
blame the financial problems on the husband. The
strong effect of financial difficulties on her divorce
might also partly be due to women’s greater sensitivity
to financial strains. Note that the scale of financial trou-
bles also contains items that may point to underlying
behavioural problems. For example, serious financial
debts, which is one of the items, may result from a gam-
bling addiction. In this sense, the effect probably reflects
more than simply a normative disapproval of the hus-
band not living up to the male breadwinner role.
Another important divorce determinant is the pres-
ence of children in marriage. Children are believed to
function as marital-specific capital because they raise the
exit costs for both husband and wife. The types of exit
costs differ, however. For men, a divorce leads to a
decline in regular contacts with the children and to a
weakening of the father–child bond. For women, the exit
costs due to children are more economic in nature.
Studies show that divorced women with children are
more likely to suffer financial setbacks and are more
likely to fall below the poverty line than childless
women. Our results suggest that both mechanisms are
important, but the evidence is more in favour of the
social interpretation than the financial interpretation.
The effects of children tend to be stronger on the odds of
a male divorce than on the odds of a female divorce.
Finally, we examined the effect of a poor match qual-
ity. We expected that the quality of the match would pri-
marily affect the joint odds of divorce. After all, when
spouses did not search well and make a poor match, this
would affect them both and one spouse should not have
greater interests in the divorce than the other. Our
results do not lend clear support for this hypothesis. Of
the four indicators we examined, there is only one case
in which the results favour our hypothesis and that is
when the husband is younger than the wife. The other
results are not in line with our general hypothesis and
can only be interpreted if auxiliary hypotheses and
assumptions are considered. One problem with these
results is that there were few joint divorces to begin with,
which makes it more difficult to find evidence in favour
of hypotheses that predict joint divorces.
The distinction between his, her, and their divorce not
only provides more direct evidence on the theoretical
interpretations behind well-known divorce determinants,
but on a more general level also offers insight into the
gendered nature of divorce. Scholars in the past have
argued that women profit less from marriage than men
and therefore speak of ‘his’ and ‘her’ marriage. Our results
show that a parallel distinction can be made between ‘his’
and ‘her’ divorce. First, we found important sex differ-
ences in the reports about whether the husband or the
wife took the initiative. We think that these differences are
a combination of men underreporting own initiative and
women overreporting own initiative. If the truth is in the
middle, we can conclude that women are twice as likely to
take the initiative as men. As such, ‘her’ divorce occurs
more frequently than ‘his’ divorce. Second, the differen-
tial effects of the determinants in our study suggest that
most of the determinants work more strongly through
‘her’ divorce than through ‘his’ divorce. What determines
his divorce is less clear, but men seem to base their
decision to divorce to a greater extent than women on the
social costs of divorce, particularly on the risk of losing
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While our study has presented more direct evidence
on the gendered nature of divorce and theoretical inter-
pretations for standard divorce determinants, we also
point to some of the possible limitations of our
approach. First, retrospective reports about who takes
the initiative may not be directly related to the interests
that people have in the divorce. We pointed to a ten-
dency to protect self-esteem and a tendency to blame
others for failure. It was not possible to study these ten-
dencies empirically but we do not think that they will
systematically bias our substantive findings. The effect of
wife’s employment, for example, would reveal the oppo-
site pattern if bias was involved. Non-working women
tend to have less self-esteem and this would make them
more likely to protect that esteem. Our finding is that
they are less likely to take the initiative, which is contrary
to the assumed bias. Second, we have added information
about the type of divorce to the models, but our under-
standing of the process of divorce is still limited. While
this was not our main goal, we nonetheless think that
our work can give new impetus to incorporating process
information in sociological and demographic divorce
models.
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